

Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities; the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy

Ref.: OL IDN 9/2025
(Please use this reference in your reply)

18 November 2025

Excellency,

We have the honour to address you in our capacities as Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers; Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities; Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 53/12, 53/14, 54/14, 59/4, 52/4 and 55/3.

In this connection, we would like to provide some analysis on the **2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code published by the House of Representatives, DPR**, (version dated 20 March 2025), considering it is an opportunity to strengthen human rights protection in criminal proceedings and address some concerns in the current implementation of the criminal procedure code, the Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana, KUHAP, (Law No. 8 of 1981).

At the outset, we would like to recall that, on 23 February 2006, Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which includes international standards on the right to a fair trial and the independence of the judiciary. We would like to offer the following comments on various provisions of the draft law, which, if not amended, may be at odds with the obligations of your Excellency's Government under international human rights law, and, in particular, with articles 9 (right to liberty and security and prohibition of arbitrary detentions), and 14 (right to a fair trial), of the ICCPR.

The 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code contains a total of 334 articles, with an inventory of issues comprising 1,570 articles/paragraphs in the main body and 590 articles/paragraphs in the explanatory section. This letter is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of all provisions, but rather, those related to fair trial guarantees.

We acknowledge and welcome ongoing efforts of the Government of Indonesia to review and amend the current Code of Criminal Procedure, with a view to strengthening human rights protection and the rule of law in conjunction with its new Criminal Code, which takes effect in January 2026. We take note that some discussions were held in 2012 around a draft reform of the KUHAP (the 2012 RUU KUHAP), which proposed measures like hierarchical oversight of law enforcement and the need for stronger regulations to protect vulnerable groups, however, these proposals were not enacted as part of the primary Criminal Procedure Code.

We would like to highlight the following comments on the draft provisions:

Judicial oversight

We wish to recall that international standards provide that State Parties to the ICCPR must ensure that individuals have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate the rights protected in the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee has highlighted the importance of establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, paragraph 15).

The fundamental guarantee of judicial oversight is absent from the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code. The concept of judicial examination through a pretrial judge or examining magistrate (*hakim pemeriksa/hakim komisararis*) reportedly proposed in the 2012 reform effort, has been removed from the draft.

The only form of judicial oversight over law enforcement actions remains the existing *praperadilan*, which, in the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code, remains largely unchanged. Pretrial hearings (*praperadilan*) are the legal mechanism where a district court reviews the legality of law enforcement's coercive actions, such as arrest, detention, searches, and seizures, before a formal trial begins. The provisions for *praperadilan*, as they stand, do not appear to be fully in line with international human rights standards and risk weakening its effectiveness: the proceedings can only be initiated after a procedural violation has occurred (post factum); they only examine formal or procedural aspects, without addressing the substance of the violation of procedural rights; the hearing process is extremely brief, lasting only seven (7) days; and they become void if the main case enters trial. The onus of the proof in the *praperadilan* hearing is on the complainant, not the officers who are accused of procedural violations. Further, law enforcement officers who are accused in the pretrial examination, frequently fail to appear at the initial hearing; such absences often result in the proceedings being dismissed by the court, denying the complainant any access to justice.

The parties allowed to file a *praperadilan* are still limited to the suspect, the suspect's family, or their legal counsel, when it concerns the legality of coercive measures (articles 149-153, RUU KUHAP 20 March 2025). Article 149(1)(a) of the Draft undermines the scope of coercive measures that can be reviewed in the *praperadilan* hearing. The article says "Coercive measures that have obtained the approval of the head of the district court before its implementation (pre-facto), are not subject to *praperadilan* complaint." This provision represents a regression, as prior judicial approval of a coercive measure is intended to assess its necessity before it is carried out, whereas a *praperadilan* hearing serves to examine how the measure was implemented. These two mechanisms serve distinct purposes and therefore cannot substitute or eliminate one another.

Also of concern is the limitation of *praperadilan* with regards to termination of investigations. For instance, while victims or complainants are permitted to file *praperadilan* in cases involving the termination of investigations or prosecutions, article 152(2) of the 2025 Draft states that *praperadilan* cannot be filed against the termination of a case if it results from a *gelar perkara* (case review session or meeting initiated by the police and/or and prosecutor's office in the investigation stage to review

and determine elements of a criminal offence).

The 2025 Draft fails to address the long-standing ambiguity surrounding the procedural rules for *praperadilan* (article 154). Ideally, it should clearly establish that the burden of proof lies with the investigator or prosecutor, requiring them to demonstrate that their use of coercive measures or procedural actions was lawful and based on sufficient grounds. However, in practice, *praperadilan* proceedings are structured similarly to civil litigation, where the burden of proof often falls on the complainant. The process is limited to a formal review of administrative documents, rather than a substantive examination of facts and material truth.

The 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code also does not recognize the objections of *praperadilan* for examining other violations of due process rights that are likely to occur in the criminal justice process, such as unreasonable delays, evidence or testimony that may have been obtained illegally, lack of legal counsel, that serve as valid grounds for filing objections during the criminal justice process.

We would like to recall that the Human Rights Committee has established that State parties must take measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation of the ICCPR, such as the ones described above on the shortcomings of the current provision on pretrial proceedings. Measures must be taken, beyond a victim-specific remedy, to avoid recurrence of violation, and such measures may require changes in the State Party's laws or practices (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, paragraph 17).

Arrest, detention, and investigation

Article 89 of the Draft, which sets out the conditions for arrest, fails to require prior judicial authorization; and article 90 paragraph (2) of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code allows arrests to be carried out without a clear time limit under certain conditions. The article's explanatory note provides an example of such a condition: when the distance between the location of arrest and the nearest investigator's office takes more than one (1) day to travel. However, this vague formulation provides no assurance that such exceptions will remain limited to that example in practice and risks arbitrary interpretation and potential human rights violations, particularly in the absence of effective oversight mechanisms.

These provisions, as they stand, would be in contravention of the international standards that require prompt and judicial oversight. In this regard, we wish to recall article 9(3) of the ICCPR, which guarantees the right of anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and to be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. The Human Rights Committee has explained that the detention of a person in a criminal investigation or prosecution must be under judicial control, that 48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the requirement of bringing a detainee "promptly" before a judge following the arrest, and that any longer delay must remain absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances (CCPR/C/GC/35).

Article 90 paragraph (3) of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code stipulates a one-day limit for arrests but allows this period to be extended indefinitely, provided that the extension is counted as part of detention time. This is highly problematic, as it

conflates arrest and detention, two distinct legal actions with different legal purposes and safeguards. Arrest is meant to be a short-term restriction to allow for initial questioning or procedural steps, while detention is a longer deprivation of liberty that must follow stricter procedural and judicial oversight. The conflation in article 90 is further exacerbated by the complete absence of any requirement to bring the arrested individual before a judge following the arrest. This procedure raises particular concerns regarding the risk of enforced disappearances. In this regard, we wish to remind Your Excellency's Government that article 10 of the 1992 Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances, which establishes that any person deprived of liberty shall be held in an officially recognized place of detention and, in conformity with national law, be brought before a judicial authority promptly after detention and that official up-to-date register of all persons deprived of their liberty shall be maintained in every place of detention. In addition, we wish to reiterate the joint statement of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on so-called "short-term" enforced disappearances, which affirms that duration is not a constitutive element of enforced disappearance under international human rights law. Regardless of the duration of an enforced disappearance, it produces serious harm and consequences for the disappeared and their families and also presents practical challenges as regards seeking protection as well as defence of their rights.

Additionally, article 88 of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that arrests should be carried out on the basis of the number of pieces of evidence, quantifying and limiting it to two pieces. Furthermore, the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code is unclear in regulating the difference between the requirements of the pieces of evidence for naming a suspect as outlined in article 85 paragraph (1), and evidence for arrest as outlined in article 88. Each of these actions must be based on specific evidence that justifies the restrictions and limitations on an individual's movement and liberty. The pieces of evidence used in naming a suspect cannot automatically be used as the basis for carrying out other actions, such as arrest, detention, search, seizure, and so on. Each requirement for coercive measures must be fulfilled based on specific evidence.

In relation to detention, the requirements for detention are regulated in article 93 paragraph (5), with a longer list of grounds for detention. The existing 1981 Criminal Procedure Code outlines three grounds for detention, including (flight risk, evidence-tampering and risk of re-offending). The 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code expands the grounds for detention which appears to be overly broad, such as: for providing information that is not in accordance with the facts during an investigation, failing to cooperate with an investigation, and obstructing an investigation.

The criteria or indicators for fulfilling the grounds for detention in the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code are also not clearly specified further obscuring the regulation of detention procedures. The decision to detain is currently made solely by law enforcement officers conducting the examination /investigation and, not by an examining judge who is free from law enforcement interests. Furthermore, there is no obligation to provide an explanation based on factual circumstances that justify detention, let alone the requirement to provide a risk assessment or social inquiries report from a separate body such as probation officers.

We recall that international human rights standards related to the principle of legality provide that criminal conduct must be clearly regulated to ensure individuals know what is prohibited so they may adequately regulate their conduct. This promotes a fair and consistent application of the law and prevents arbitrary punishment. Offenses must be precisely defined by law, avoiding overly broad or vague prohibitions. Clear regulation supports due process, provides legal certainty, and ensures that only conduct that poses a genuine threat is subject to criminal sanctions.

The provision under article 105 letter (e) of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code, which regulates the search of electronic information, remains ambiguous. In essence, this type of search is intended to obtain electronic evidence in the form of data or information stored within an electronic device or medium. However, to access and retrieve such evidence, the search must be directed at the device or medium itself, not at the data or information directly. Moreover, any data or information intended to be seized must be supported by a separate seizure warrant. The draft fails to clearly distinguish between the procedures for searching electronic devices and those for seizing electronically stored evidence.

Next, there is the phrase "urgent circumstances" in the provision on search as regulated in article 106 paragraph (4) of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code. The term "urgent circumstances" should ideally be elaborated within the article's normative provision, not only in the explanatory section, to distinguish the meaning of "urgent circumstances" in each type of coercive measure, such as seizure or wiretapping. The draft fails to outline the specific limitations of "urgent circumstances." We would like to recall again the principle of legality and highlight that vague and ambiguous terms and definitions may lend themselves to broad interpretations that may risk violating due process guarantees.

The ambiguity surrounding the standard of "urgent circumstances" also appears in the regulation of seizure as stipulated in article 112 paragraph (2) of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code. This article does not regulate the timeframe within which the court must be notified when a seizure is conducted under urgent circumstances. Ideally, such notification should be made within one day after the seizure is carried out to ensure prompt oversight. This issue is further exacerbated by the absence of provisions regarding the refusal of a seizure warrant from the court, which has implications for items that have already been seized and the mechanism for returning those items.

The 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code does not regulate the limitation of what criminal offences can be uncovered through wiretapping. The specific criminal offences referred to should be limited to several categories that indicate the seriousness and complexity of the investigation, not for all crimes. Additionally, the regulation of the wiretapping notification mechanism is crucial. The purpose is to ensure that individuals who are the target of unlawful wiretapping actions, whether suspects or third parties, have access to their rights, including the return of data or information, guarantees for the deletion of wiretapped data, and compensation. These kinds of provisions are absent from the draft. The 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code does not stipulate that private communications must be conducted based on a court order. This creates the potential for arbitrary actions by investigators or prosecutors.

With regard to permissible restrictions to the right to privacy (article 17 of the ICCPR), we refer to the general comment No. 16 of the Human Rights Committee that States must ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, should be authorized by laws "(a) publicly accessible; (b) contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access to and use of communications data are tailored to specific legitimate aims; (c) are sufficiently precise, specifying in detail the precise circumstances in which any such interference may be permitted, the procedures for authorizing, the categories of persons who may be placed under surveillance, the limits on the duration of surveillance, and procedures for the use and storage of the data collected; and (d) provide for effective safeguards against abuse."

The interference with an individual's right to privacy is only permissible if it is neither unlawful nor arbitrary (A/73/163, para. 10, (a) and (b)). Any interference must be reasonable and meet the critical tests of legality, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination. The Human Rights Committee has later specified that data must be collected and handled in line with recognized data protection principles, including the principles of lawfulness and fairness, transparency in collection and processing, purpose limitation, data minimization, accuracy, storage limitation, security of data and accountability for data handling.

Role of advocates and legal aid

Article 33 of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that during the suspect's examination in the investigation stage, advocates are only allowed to observe and listen, as well as express objections if the investigator's questions are intimidating or coercive. This weak role of the advocate leads to an imbalance in the construction of facts recorded in the Investigation Report (*Berita Acara Pemeriksaan/ BAP*). In practice, the BAP is routinely used as the basis for examination in court proceedings and appeals.

Article 197 paragraph (10) of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code which states, "After the examination of the Defendant, the Prosecutor may call additional Witnesses or Experts to refute the evidence presented by the Advocate during the trial." However, the defendant and their legal counsel are not given the same opportunity to offer further rebuttals. Currently, access to evidence and/or exhibits is only granted to the Advocate once the Prosecutor has included them in the Indictment.

The freedom of advocates in carrying out their duties and profession is also restricted in the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code. In article 142 paragraph (3) (b), the draft prohibits advocates from giving opinions outside the court regarding their clients' issues. This provision clearly contradicts various regulations that guarantee the status of advocates as independent. This provision also poses a threat to the role of advocates in carrying out non-litigation roles, including providing legal assistance outside the court. Moreover, this constitutes a limitation on the right to freedom of speech and expression.

Article 146 paragraphs (4) and (5) of the Draft still allow the absence of legal assistance if the suspect or defendant declares the refusal to be assisted, as proven by a record created by the authorized official (investigator or prosecutor). The 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code does not include legal consequences when the right to legal

assistance is not fulfilled.

The provision in article 146 paragraph (4) of the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code also creates a loophole for the absence of legal counsel for suspects/defendants who are facing the death penalty, life imprisonment, a prison sentence of 15 years or more, or those who are facing a sentence of 5 years or more but are unable to afford or do not have their own lawyer, if the suspect/defendant refuses.

We once again wish to bring to the attention of Your Excellency's Government the right to a fair trial, enshrined in article 14 of the ICCPR. Article 14(1) of the ICCPR guarantees the right of all persons to be equal before the courts and tribunals. The right to equality before courts and tribunals also ensures equality of arms. This means that the same procedural rights are to be provided to all the parties unless distinctions are based on law and can be justified on objective and reasonable grounds, not entailing actual disadvantage or other unfairness to the defendant. There is no equality of arms if, for instance, only the prosecutor, but not the defendant, is allowed to appeal a certain decision.

Further, article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of one's defence and to communicate with counsel of one's own choosing, which is essential to the principle of equality of arms. In accordance with principle 9 and guideline 8 of the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, the right to legal assistance by counsel of a person's choice must be granted at any time during detention, including immediately after the moment of apprehension, and must be granted promptly. Further, under the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers and principles 17 and 18 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, persons must be immediately informed by the competent authority of their right to be assisted by a lawyer of their own choice when charged with a criminal offence.

International standards also provide that lawyers must be able to perform their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment, or improper interference by the authorities. We underline Human Rights Committee's general comment No. 32, according to which "adequate facilities" must include access to documents and other evidence, including "all materials that the prosecution plans to offer in court against the accused or that are exculpatory." As provided under the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, it is the duty of the competent authorities to ensure lawyers' access to appropriate information, files and documents in their possession or control in sufficient time to enable lawyers to provide effective legal assistance to their clients. Such access should be provided at the earliest appropriate time.

In addition, we would like to refer to the United Nations Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, which provide that capital punishment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes, after a legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, including the right of anyone suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital punishment may be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings. The Safeguards specify that persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime

shall not be sentenced to death. The Human Rights Committee has noted that “In cases of trials leading to the imposition of the death penalty scrupulous respect of the guarantees of fair trial is particularly important. The imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial, in which the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant have not been respected, constitutes a violation of the right to life (article 6 of the Covenant, CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 59)”.

Complaints and reporting criminal offences from the public

The 2012 Draft RUU KUHAP, Article 12, introduced a system of hierarchical oversight for law enforcement officials. However, the provisions found in article 12 of the 2012 Draft RUU KUHAP have been omitted from the 2025 Draft. Under article 23 of the 2025 Draft, if a report or complaint is not responded to, the complainant may report the matter to the investigator's superior or to an official responsible for oversight within the investigative institution. The regulation is thus limited to internal reporting mechanisms within the investigative body itself. There is no guarantee of what follow-up, if any, will take place after such a report is made to a superior. There is also no requirement for investigators to take action within a set time frame or to determine the alleged criminal offence based on the report. In practice, especially in cases involving victims of sexual violence, legal aid or services providers have frequently made such internal reports to investigative institutions, yet the outcomes are often unclear and fail to result in effective case handling. Furthermore, the 2025 Draft Criminal Procedure Code fails to provide any mechanism for victims to formally object to unreasonable delays in case handling.

As they stand, the proposed amendments would limit the right of victims to complain or initiate charges against public officials and deny victims and their families the right to file a criminal complaint directly with an investigating judge. This would effectively leave the choice to proceed against State officials entirely up to internal procedures, thereby undermining accountability of State officials, including in cases of enforced disappearances, torture and other ill-treatment, denial of medical care and other human rights violations or abuses of power. We further emphasize that under article 13 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (acceded to by Indonesia on 28 October 1998), States parties must ensure that any individual who alleges he or she has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his or her case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities. We further underline that article 2 of the Convention guarantees to any person whose rights or freedoms recognized therein are violated the right to an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity, and the right of any person claiming such a remedy to have their right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State.

The Human Rights Committee notes that administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies. It also noted that a failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could give rise to a breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13,

paragraph 15).

Equal access to justice for persons with disabilities

We wish to highlight that several provisions in the Draft fall short of the standards set by the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, which Indonesia ratified on 30 November 2011. We particularly highlight the importance of articles 5, 12, and 13 of the Convention to fulfil and protect the right of persons to effective access to justice on an equal basis with others.

We particularly refer to art. 208 of the Draft which contains outdated and stigmatizing language for persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities and undermines their legal capacity. According to this article, persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities are treated in the same way as children and their testimony should be considered only as guidance and not as full sworn witness statement. As such, their testimony will be given reduced credibility, treated as secondary evidence, or require corroboration, which is discriminatory on the basis of disability.

We stress that to align with art. 12 and 13 of the Convention on legal capacity and equal access to justice respectively, persons with disabilities must be recognized as persons before the law with equal standing in courts and tribunals, as observed by the Committee on the rights of persons with disabilities (CRPD/C/GC/1). We further refer to the International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities which reaffirm that all persons with disabilities have legal capacity and that States should “repeal or amend all laws, regulations, policies, guidelines and practices that restrict or exclude witnesses with disabilities from presenting testimony based on assessments of their capacity to testify.”

To guarantee equal access to justice and support their participation in judicial proceedings, persons with disabilities have the right to procedural accommodations. We recognize that art. 137 of the Draft provides for services and infrastructure for persons with disabilities during all stages of examination, with these services and infrastructure being regulated through a specific governmental regulation. However, we believe that to clearly safeguard the principles of non-discrimination and inclusivity, the Draft should contain more concrete provisions outlining the principles, responsibility, forms of accommodations, funding, timeliness, safeguarding, and complaint mechanisms to guarantee appropriate procedural accommodations for persons with disabilities.

In line with art. 13 of the Convention, States are required to ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations. The Committee on the rights of persons with disabilities clarified that, unlike reasonable accommodation, the concept of disproportionality and undue burden does not apply to procedural accommodations in the context of access to justice (CRPD/C/GC/6). Further guidance on the right to procedural accommodation can be found under principle 3 of the International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities. We particularly refer to the different forms of individualized procedural accommodations outlined therein, including intermediaries or facilitators, procedural adjustments and modifications, and adjustments to the environment and communication support, to ensure access to justice for persons with disabilities.

In view of the above considerations, we urge your Excellency's Government to conduct an independent and comprehensive review and reconsideration of the draft code. We further recommend that this process include broad consultations with legal experts and civil society representatives to ensure that the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code comply with Indonesia's obligations under international human rights instruments, particularly with respect to ensuring transparency, safeguarding fair trial, and protecting fundamental freedoms.

We offer technical assistance for this purpose and affirm our goal to engage positively with your Government. In adopting such an approach, Indonesia would present a model of good practice for other States, using its strong legal culture as a means to amend, review and tighten legal definitions to show the responsiveness of its legal system.

As it is our responsibility, under the mandates provided to us by the Human Rights Council, to seek to clarify all cases brought to our attention, we would be grateful for your observations on the following matters:

1. Please provide any additional information and/or comment(s) you may have on the above-mentioned observations.
2. Please explain how the above-mentioned amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code comply with Indonesia's obligations under international law, in particular with the principles and standards protecting against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and enforced disappearances, the rights to due process and fair trial guarantees, equal access to justice, and the right to privacy, enshrined in international human rights instruments, including in the ICCPR.
3. Please indicate the measures taken or planned to be taken by your Excellency's Government to review the proposed amendments to the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure in light of the observations shared above, with the meaningful participation of legal experts and civil society.

This communication, as a comment on pending or recently adopted legislation, regulations or policies, and any response received from your Excellency's Government will be made public via the communications reporting [website](#) after 48 hours. They will also subsequently be made available in the usual report to be presented to the Human Rights Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Margaret Satterthwaite
Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers

Heba Hagrass
Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities

Gabriella Citroni
Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

Gina Romero
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association

Mary Lawlor
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders

Ana Brian Nougrères
Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy